

Message Text

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TAGS: NATO, XA, PFOR

SUBJECT:REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

REF: USNATO 07553

1. THERE FOLLOWS THE TABLE OF CONTENTS AND TEXT, WITH
NUMBERED PARAGRAPHS, OF THE DEPARTMENT'S CONTRIBUTION TO
THE REPORT OF THE EXPERTS' COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION IN
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA.

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VI. AFRICAN POLICY OF THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES

3. TEXT

I. THE HORN OF AFRICA

ETHIOPIA

1. THE ETHIOPIAN PROVISIONAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT'S (EPMG)

FIRST PRIORITIES REMAIN MILITARY: THE ERITREAN CAMPAIGN

AND PACIFICATION OF THE OGADEN. THE EARLY STAGES OF THE

CAMPAIGN FOR ERITREA WENT WELL FROM THE ETHIOPIAN POINT OF

VIEW, AND IT APPEARS THAT THE GOVERNMENT FORCES WILL

EVENTUALLY CAPTURE THE MAIN TOWNS AND REOPEN THE MAIN
ROADS. HOWEVER THE ETHIOPIANS HAVE YET TO CAPTURE THE
TOWN OF KEREN. WHEN AND IF THEY DO, THE INSURGENCY WOULD
REVERT COMPLETELY TO GUERRILLA WARFARE. THE ETHIOPIAN
AUTHORITIES ARE PROVIDING REHABILITATION AID IN "LIBERA-
TED" AREAS, AND ARE PROSELYTIZING THE ERITREAN POPULATION,
WHILE THEY SEEK THROUGH VARIOUS CHANNELS TO BRING THE

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INSURGENTS TO NEGOTIATE.

2. THE ERITREANS, WHOSE FOREIGN SUPPORTERS IN THE ARAB
WORLD ARE UNLIKELY TO MATCH THE MILITARY SUPPORT ETHIOPIA
RECEIVES FROM THE USSR AND CUBA, NOW SEEM TO HAVE LOST THE
HOPE OF INDEPENDENCE. BUT THEY REMAIN PUBLICLY DEFIANT,
AND ARE PREPARING TO RESUME GUERRILLA WARFARE. A MAJOR
HANDICAP FOR THEM CONTINUES TO BE THEIR INABILITY TO MAKE
COMMON CAUSE POLITICALLY.

3. THE WESTERN SOMALI LIBERATION FRONT HAS TAKEN
ADVANTAGE OF ETHIOPIAN PREOCCUPATION WITH ERITREA TO HARASS
THE ETHIOPIAN MILITIA WHO POLICE THE OGADEN. THIS HAS
RESULTED IN A STEADILY INCREASING CASUALTY RATE, AND HAS
STIMULATED ETHIOPIAN THREATS OF RETALIATION. HOWEVER, THE
ETHIOPIANS HAVE NOT YET UTILIZED EITHER ETHIOPIAN OR
CUBAN GARRISONS IN THE JIJIGA AREA AGAINST THE
INSURGENTS.

4. ON THE DOMESTIC SIDE, THE EPMG IS EVOLVING POLITICAL
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MECHANISMS TO INSTITUTIONALIZE THE REVOLUTION, IN OBEISANCE TO THE MARXIST-LENINIST ORTHODOXY URGED UPON ETHIOPIA BY THE USSR AND CUBA. CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY WILL REMAIN IN MILITARY HANDS, ALTHOUGH MENGISTU HAS BEEN MAKING PREPARATIONS TO PROCLAIM THE "PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA", AS WELL AS THE FORMATION OF A "WORKERS' PARTY". SUCH A PARTY WOULD PROBABLY HAVE AS ITS NUCLEUS THE EXISTING MILITARY-CONTROLLED PARTY, SEDED. MENGISTU IS MOVING TO CONSOLIDATE HIS PERSONAL AUTHORITY, FOR EXAMPLE BY HAVING TROUBLESOME POLITICAL FIGURES JAILED AND BY APPOINTING MILITARY OFFICERS TO PROVINCIAL GOVERNORSHIPS. TEN OF THE 14 ETHIOPIAN PROVINCES ARE NOW ADMINISTERED BY MILITARY OFFICERS. MENGISTU ALLOWS THE MEDIA TO PURSUE A STRIDENT MARXIST LINE, HEAVY WITH ANTI-IMPERIALIST RHETORIC. SOME ATTENTION IS BEING PAID TO STREAMLINING THE INEFFECTIVE BUREAUCRACY, BUT MUCH NEEDS TO BE DONE IN THIS CONNECTION.

5. ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY EMPHASIZES THE ETHIOPIAN CASE

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WITH RESPECT TO ERITREA AND THE OGADEN. MENGISTU IS SEEKING RAPPROCHEMENT WITH SUDAN, CHIEFLY TO REDUCE FOREIGN SUPPORT OF THE ERITREANS. HIS MAIN FOREIGN ADVERSARIES ARE

ARAB, NOT AFRICAN; THE LATTER ARE DISPOSED TO ACCEPT

ETHIOPIA'S POSITIONS DESPITE SOME UNEASE AT THE HEAVY

SOVIET AND CUBAN INFLUENCE THERE.

6. MENGISTU ALSO SEEMS TO WANT TO IMPROVE HIS RELATIONS

WITH NON-COMMUNIST NATIONS, AS A MANIFESTATION OF NON-

ALIGNMENT BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY AS A SOURCE OF ECONOMIC AID.

MORE IDEOLOGICALLY ORIENTED MEMBERS OF THE DERGUE SEEM

LESS INTERESTED, BUT WE ANTICIPATE THAT MENGISTU'S

PRAGMATISM WILL LEAD TO FURTHER ETHIOPIAN INITIATIVES IN

THIS DIRECTION.

7. SOVIET AND CUBAN ROLE. THE USSR AND CUBA HAVE HELPED

IN THE ERITREAN CAMPAIGN WITH LOGISTIC SUPPORT, TRAINING,

AND PLANNING ASSISTANCE. IF THE CUBANS HAVE BEEN INVOLVED

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IN COMBAT OPERATIONS THEIR PARTICIPATION HAS PROBABLY BEEN

LIMITED TO MANNING SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEMS. THE LOW

SOVIET AND CUBAN PROFILE IN THE ERITREAN INSURGENCY, AND

THEIR EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, ARE

INDICATIVE OF THEIR SENSITIVITY TO CRITICISM FROM THE ARAB

WORLD AND AFRICA OVER THIS ISSUE. IN THE OGADEN, CUBAN

TROOPS REMAIN IN GARRISON.

8. RUMORS PERSIST OF TENSION BETWEEN MENGISTU AND HIS

SOVIET AND CUBAN ADVISORS. THERE ARE SUCH TENSIONS, BUT

AT THIS TIME THEY SEEM TO BE FAR FROM INSURMOUNTABLE. THE

ESSENTIAL PROBLEM IS TO RECONCILE ETHIOPIAN NATIONALISM --

EXEMPLIFIED BY MENGISTU -- WITH MARXIST-LENINIST IDEOLOGY.

THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION MENTIONED EARLIER MAY HELP TO
BRIDGE THIS GAP. AT PRESENT, THE USSR AND CUBA SEEM TO BE
MOVING WITH SOME SUCCESS TOWARD A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP
WITH ETHIOPIA.

SOMALIA

9. ALTHOUGH THE SOMALIS ARE IN A WEAK MILITARY AND

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DIPLOMATIC POSITION FOLLOWING THEIR DEFEAT IN THE OGADEN,
THEY CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE INSURGENTS THERE AND HAVE NOT
ESCHEWED THEIR IRREDENTIST POLICY. THE TWO INSURGENT
GROUPS IN THE OGADEN ARE TRYING TO ESTABLISH A POLITICAL
IDENTITY SEPARATE FROM THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT, WITH LITTLE
SUCCESS SO FAR.

10. SIAD CONTINUES TO SEEK ARMS FROM ALL POSSIBLE
SOURCES -- FOR EXAMPLE, THE WEST, THE ARABS, IRAN, AND THE
PRC. POTENTIAL DONORS REMAIN CONCERNED ABOUT SOMALIA'S
IRREDENTIST SINGLE-MINDEDNESS, AND THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS ARE
LIKELY TO BE STRICTLY LIMITED TO DEFENSIVE WEAPONRY.

11. DOMESTICALLY, SIAD PUT DOWN A COUP ATTEMPT IN APRIL,
AND THE GOVERNMENT IS NOW TRYING SOME 150 COUP PARTICI-
PANTS. THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH SENTENCES COULD BE
DOMESTICALLY UNSETTLING. THIS COUP ATTEMPT REFLECTED CLAN
AND TRIBAL DIFFERENCES RATHER THAN EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE.

SIAD AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARGUE, HOWEVER, THAT FAILURE TO
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OBTAIN MILITARY HELP COULD RESULT IN SUCH INTERFERENCE,
AND IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT A REPLACEMENT REGIME MIGHT
SEEK RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE USSR IN THE ABSENCE OF NON-
COMMUNIST SUPPORT. SOMALIA MADE NO HEADDAY INTERNATION-
ALLY IN PURSUING ITS CASE AT THE OAU SUMMIT IN KHARTOUM OR
THE SUBSEQUENT NON-ALIGNED MINISTERIAL MEETING.

DJIBOUTI

12. PRESIDENT GOULED IS MOVING RATHER SLOWLY TOWARD
CONCILIATION OF ETHNIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE MAJORITY
ISSAS AND THE MINORITY AFARS. IN FEBRUARY HE NOMINATED
A CABINET IN WHICH AFARS ARE REPRESENTED IN NUMBERS EQUAL
TO ISSAS. THE AFARS LATER DEMANDED THAT THE CONSTITUTION
BE AMENDED TO GRANT THE PRIME MINISTRY ADDITIONAL
AUTHORITY, THAT PRISONERS ACCUSED OF SUBVERSION BE
RELEASED, AND THAT THE AFARS BE GRANTED PARITY IN
NUMBERS IN STAFFING THE MILITARY AND POLICE. NONE OF
THESE DEMANDS HAS BEEN FULLY MET, BUT EVIDENTLY PRIME
MINISTER KAMIL AND HIS AFAR COLLEAGUES ARE ENCOURAGED BY
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GOULED'S ATTITUDE, SINCE THEY DID NOT CARRY OUT AN
IMPLICIT THREAT TO RESIGN OVER THEM. AFARS REMAIN
DISGRUNTLED, HOWEVER; THEY GENERALLY BOYCOTTED THE JUNE

INDEPENDENCE CELEBRATIONS, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE RECEIVED

GOULED POLITELY IN RECENT TOURS OF AFAR AREAS.

13. GOULED'S FOREIGN POLICY, REFLECTING AN APPRECIATION

OF THE COMPARATIVE POWER OF HIS NEIGHBORS, HAS MOVED

TOWARD COOPERATION WITH THE ETHIOPIANS AGAINST BOTH AFAR

AND ISSA DISSIDENTS. RELATIONS WITH SOMALIA HAVE SUFFERED

AS A RESULT. THE DJIBOUTI-ADDIS ABABA RAILROAD REOPENED

IN JUNE AND WAS LATER INTERDICTED BY INSURGENTS, BUT HAS

NOW BEEN SECURED WITH ETHIOPIAN HELP. THE RAILROAD IS NOT

CARRYING MILITARY SUPPLIES. GOULED HAS BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN

SOME AID FROM LIBYA AND SAUDI ARABIA.

II. SOUTHERN AFRICA

SOUTH AFRICA

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14. INTERNAL - WHITE POLITICS. THE VORSTER GOVERNMENT,

DESPITE ITS MASSIVE ELECTORAL MANDATE HAS NOT UNDERTAKEN

ANY MAJOR NEW POLICY INITIATIVES IN THE PAST SEVERAL

MONTHS. NO IMPORTANT LEGISLATION WAS INTRODUCED DURING

THE PARLIAMENTARY SESSION, PUBLICATION OF CONTROVERSIAL

COMMITTEE REPORTS HAVE BEEN DELAYED, AND THE CONSTITUTION-

AL PROPOSALS FIRST PUBLISHED LAST YEAR ARE NOW NOT

EXPECTED TO BE INTRODUCED INTO PARLIAMENT UNTIL 1979.

15. THIS MEASURED POLITICAL PACE MAY WELL RESULT BOTH

FROM A LACK OF PREPAREDNESS ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT--

THE ELECTION WAS A SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED DEVELOPMENT--AND

FROM TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS,
FOR INSTANCE, HAVE NOT WON APPROVAL FROM COLORED AND ASIAN
POPULATION GROUPS, AND THE GOVERNMENT IS BELATEDLY
OFFERING TO CONSULT WITH THEIR LEADERS IN AN EFFORT TO
LINE UP SOME SUPPORT.

16. THE SUCCESSION STRUGGLE SEEMS TO BE HEATING UP, FED
BOTH BY GROWING SPECULATION ABOUT VORSTER'S GRADUALLY

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ERODING HEALTH AND THE OPENING WHICH WOULD BE CREATED IF
HE MOVED "UP" TO THE POSITION OF STATE PRESIDENT WHICH THE
NEW CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM WOULD CREATE.

17. CORNELIUS "CONNIE" MULDER, LONG CONSIDERED THE
FAVORITE, HAS SUFFERED SOME POLITICAL DAMAGE AS A RESULT
OF THE REVELATIONS CONCERNING LARGE-SCALE CORRUPTION AND
ILLEGAL PROCEDURES WITHIN THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
WHICH HE HEADED FOR YEARS. FOREIGN MINISTER ROELOF "PIK"
BOTH A ALSO IS IN THE RUNNING FOR THE PRIME MINISTERSHIP.
OTHER MAJOR CONTENDERS ARE P. W. BOTH A, MINISTER OF
DEFENSE AND S.I. "FANIE" BOTH A, MINISTER OF LABOR. THESE
LAST TWO, UNLIKE THE FOREIGN MINISTER, HAVE STRONG,
ESTABLISHED PROVINCIAL PARTY BASES.

18. THE VORSTER GOVERNMENT REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE
NATIONAL PARTY POLICY OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT. THE ONLY
ALTERNATIVE, THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD PARLIAMENT IN APRIL,
IS SOME FORM OF A "UNITARY STATE." AS THIS SYSTEM IMPLIES
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MAJORITY RULE, IT REMAINS ANATHEMA TO NP MEMBERS, AND PROBABLY, TO MOST WHITE SOUTH AFRICANS. THE OFFICIAL OPPOSITION, THE PROGRESSIVE REFORM PARTY, HAS PROMISED TO PRESENT AN ALTERNATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL AT ITS ANNUAL PARTY CONFERENCE IN NOVEMBER. THIS IS EXPECTED TO PROVIDE FOR EQUAL FRANCHISE RIGHTS WITHIN A FEDERAL SYSTEM AND GUARANTEES OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES; ONLY A MINORITY WITHIN THE PFP ADVOCATES THE CONCEPT OF ONE-MAN-ONE-VOTE. THE PFP, IN ITS FIRST TERM AS OFFICIAL OPPOSITION GOT OFF TO A WEAK START, ALTHOUGH IT GAINED IN CONFIDENCE AS THE SESSION WORE ON. WHILE IT WAS HAMPERED BY ITS INABILITY TO PRESENT CLEAR POLICY ALTERNATIVES, ITS VIEWS WERE SUFFICIENTLY DIFFERENT FROM THE NP'S AS TO MAKE THE SESSION PARTICULARLY ACRIMONIOUS.

19. THE MAP OF SOUTH AFRICA IS GRADUALLY BEING REDRAWN.

FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS:

--VENDA, THE THIRD HOMELAND TO DO SO, ANNOUNCED IT

ILL SEEK INDEPENDENCE IN 1979;

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--POPULATIONS CONTINUE TO BE RELOCATED; IN CAPE

PROVINCE WHITE RESIDENTS HAVE BEEN COMPELLED TO MOVE

FROM AREAS THAT HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED COLORED, AND

BLACK SQUATTER SITES ARE BEING LEVELED AND THEIR
INHABITANTS FORCIBLY "REPATRIATED" TO BLACK HOMELANDS;
--INDIAN TRADERS HAVE BEEN BARRED FROM DOING BUSINESS
IN CENTRAL COMMERCIAL DISTRICTS.

20. BLACK POLITICS. AMONG SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICALLY
CONSCIOUS BLACK POPULATION, THE MOMENTUM STEMMING FROM THE
1976 DEMONSTRATIONS HAS LARGELY PETERED OUT. THE STUDENT
MOVEMENT HAS SEEMINGLY DISSOLVED, ITS LEADERSHIP IN EXILE
OR IN PRISON. THE COMMITTEE OF TEN NOW SEEMS RELEGATED TO
A SYMBOLIC ROLE AND ITS CHAIRMAN, DR. NHATO MOTLANA, HAS
BEEN WARNED TO SHOW RESTRAINT IN HIS PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS
IF HE IS TO AVOID FURTHER RETALIATORY MEASURES BY THE
AUTHORITIES.

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21. THE NEW COMMUNITY COUNCILS, DESPITE THEIR MODEST
POPULAR SUPPORT, ARE NOW IN PLACE, AND THOSE LIMITED
REFORMS WHICH THE GOVERNMENT CONTEMPLATES IN THE BLACK
TOWNSHIPS WILL BE EFFECTED THROUGH THEM. IN JUNE SOWETO
OBTAINED FULL COMMUNITY STATUS AND ITS COMMUNITY COUNCIL
NOW HAS A FULL RANGE OF CIVIC POWERS, EXCLUDING THE RIGHT
OF TAXATION. SOWETO WILL BE A TEST CASE. IF THE
EXPERIMENT WORKS, SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE APPROVED
FOR OTHER BLACK URBAN AREAS. IN EFFECT, SOWETO NOW HAS
THOSE RIGHTS AND DUTIES WHICH THE COMMITTEE OF TEN HAD
EARLIER DEMANDED.

22. A RECENT BLACK OPINION POLL SHOWED CHIEF GATSHA BUTHELEZI AS THE PREFERRED BLACK LEADER. BUT, ALTHOUGH HE IS WELL KNOWN, IT IS HARD TO CALCULATE THE DEPTH AND FIRMNESS OF HIS POLITICAL BASE BEYOND HIS ZULU SUPPORT. HIS PARTY, INKATHA, IS THE KEY COMPONENT IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN BLACK ALLIANCE (SABA), FORMED EARLY THIS YEAR.

23. SABA'S MAIN FOCUS IS THE CONVENING OF AN ALL-SOUTH

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AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE AND IT HAS ISSUED AN OPEN INVITATION TO OTHER BLACK MOVEMENTS TO JOIN IT. IN ORDER TO AVOID PROVOKING THE SOUTH AFRICAN AUTHORITIES, HOWEVER, IT IS NOT CANVASSING ACTIVELY FOR ADDITIONAL SUPPORTERS. IN AN EFFORT TO GIVE ITSELF AN INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION, IT HAS CALLED UPON CHIEFS OF STATE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA TO ESTABLISH A "SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES TREATY CONFERENCE."

24. EXTERNAL. FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA INFORMED PARLIAMENT THAT ALL SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS WOULD BE "MARKEDLY INFLUENCED" BY DEVELOPMENTS IN NAMIBIA AND RHODESIA.

25. THE GOVERNMENT DECISION TO ACCEPT THE CONTACT GROUP'S PROPOSALS IN NAMIBIA WAS A POLITICAL VICTORY FOR FOREIGN MINISTER "PIK; BOTHA AND OTHER LIBERAL ELEMENTS IN THE GOVERNMENT. THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION WAS WELCOMED BY ITS OPPOSITION. THE PF SPOKESMAN FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS CALLED

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THE DECISION "PROBABLY THE MOST STATESMANLIKE ACT" OF THE NP IN ITS 30 YEARS IN POWER.

26. THE ACCEPTANCE WAS, HOWEVER, SOMEWHAT TARNISHED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN RAIDS INTO ANGOLA IN EARLY MAY. THESE RAIDS REPORTEDLY RESULTED IN 504 DEAD, AND 254 WOUNDED. MOST WERE SWAPO SUPPORTERS, ALTHOUGH THE ANGOLAN ARMY ALSO TOOK A FEW CASUALTIES. THE RAIDS WERE PREFACED BY A SOUTH AFRICAN MEDIA CAMPAIGN WHICH WARNED OF A SWAPO BUILD-UP AND OF PLANS TO ESCALATE ITS MILITARY OPERATION IN NAMIBIA. THE EXTENT TO WHICH SWAPO'S COMBAT CAPABILITY SUFFERED AS A RESULT OF THE RAIDS IS UNCLEAR, BUT SOUTH AFRICAN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY LEADERS APPARENTLY CONSIDER THEM A CLEAR SUCCESS.

27. SOUTH AFRICA CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE "INTERNAL SETTLEMENT" IN RHODESIA, BUT IS FULLY AWARE THAT SMITH HAS NOT SOLVED THAT COUNTRY'S DUAL DILEMMA: TO STOP THE GUERRILLA WAR AND TO ACHIEVE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION.

IT HAS PUBLICLY CALLED ON JOSHUA NKOMO TO JOIN THE REGIME

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IN SALISBURY, AND WILL SUPPORT ALL EFFORTS TO BROADEN THE BASE OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT TO INCLUDE NKOMO AND HIS FOLLOWERS. PRETORIA, HOWEVER, LIKE THE RHODESIAN

FRONT LEADERSHIP, OPPOSES THE INCLUSION OF ROBERT MUGABE.

-- DERSHIP, OPPOSES THE INCLUSION OF ROBERT MUGABE.

28. SOUTH AFRICA SIGNED A SEVEN YEAR RAIL AND PORT AGREE-

MENT WITH MOZAMBIQUE RECENTLY, AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH WILL

LINK THESE TWO COUNTRIES ECONOMICALLY REGARDLESS OF THEIR

EXTENSIVE POLITICAL DIFFERENCES. UNDER ITS TERMS, SOUTH

AFRICA UNDERTAKES TO DOUBLE ITS EXPORTS (HALF OF THE

TONNAGE) THROUGH THE PORT OF MAPUTO.

RHODESIA

29. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF THE AUGUST 14 SMITH-NKOMO

MEETING AND DISAGREEMENTS REGARDING FUTURE TACTICS AMONG

THE FRONT-LINE STATES AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAVE SET

BACK PROSPECTS FOR ACHIEVING AN EARLY PEACE IN RHODESIA.

NEGOTIATING EFFORTS ARE UNLIKELY TO BE RENEWED UNTIL THE
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DUST OF THE CURRENT UPHEAVAL SETTLES. THE PRINCIPALS ARE

STUCK FOR THE MOMENT ON THEIR CURRENT TRACKS.

30. THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT HAS MADE LITTLE PROGRESS TO

DATE. THE SECURITY SITUATION IS INCREASINGLY SERIOUS, IF

NOT YET URGENT. THE AMNESTY PROGRAM HAS BROUGHT FEW

GUERRILLAS OVER TO SALISBURY'S SIDE. THE ECONOMY IS

DETERIORATING AND MAY NOT BE ABLE TO SUPPORT THE WAR

EFFORT AT CURRENT, LET ALONE EXPANDED LEVELS, MUCH LONGER.

DISILLUSIONMENT AMONG BOTH WHITES AND BLACKS IS SPREADING.

31. YET THE GOVERNING EXECUTIVE COUNCIL APPEARS TO BE

PARALYZED, LACKING THE DETERMINATION TO LAUNCH DRAMATIC

INITIATIVES, E.G., TO IMPROVE RACE RELATIONS, OR THE
STRENGTH TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE-FIRE. IN SPITE OF THEIR
ERODING POSITIONS, BISHOP MUZOREWA AND REV. SITHOLE ARE
STILL HANGING ON TO THEIR SLIM HOPES OF TAKING POWER ON
DECEMBER 31.

32. SMITH MAY NOT YET BELIEVE THAT HIS CAUSE IS LOST, OR
IS AT LEAST UNWILLING TO ADMIT IT SO LONG AS THERE IS A
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POSSIBILITY OF SECURING WHITE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
INTERESTS IN AN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE. SOUTH AFRICA
CONTINUES TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SUPPORT TO
SALISBURY AND WHILE IT URGES SMITH TO PURSUE A SETTLEMENT,
HAS NOT PRESSED HIM TO MAKE ANY NEW CONCESSIONS.

33. EXTERNAL EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT MAJORITY RULE. THE
PATRIOTIC FRONT HAS STEPPED UP ITS MILITARY OPERATIONS,
BUT HAS NOT YET ACHIEVED A FAVORABLE BATTLEFIELD BALANCE,
NOR "LIBERATED" ANY SIZEABLE AREAS OF RHODESIA. ZANU
AND ZAPU GUERRILLAS OPERATING OUT OF MOZAMBIQUE AND
ZAMBIA, RESPECTIVELY, APPEAR TO BE CONTENT TO WAGE A
WAR OF ATTRITION WHILE SEEKING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT
MORE OR LESS ON THE LINES OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN. IN
THIS, THE FRONT CONTINUES TO ENJOY THE SUPPORT OF THE
FRONT-LINE STATES, ALTHOUGH ZAMBIA AND MOZAMBIQUE APPEAR
TO BE MORE ANXIOUS FOR A SETTLEMENT THAN EVER.

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34. BOTH SIDES STILL ACCEPT THE US-UK DIPLOMATIC INTER-
VENTION, ALTHOUGH NEITHER IS AGREEABLE TO ALL THE TERMS
OF THE PLAN. US-UK EFFORTS TO BRING THE PRINCIPALS
HE PLAN. US-UK EFFORTS TO BRING THE PRINCIPALS
TOGETHER AT AN ALL-PARTIES MEETING IN ORDER TO FORGE A
SETTLEMENT ARE UNCERTAIN OF SUCCESS AT THE TIME OF WRITING,
BUT IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT SOME FORM OF ROUNDTABLE CONFERENCE
WILL OCCUR BEFORE THE YEAR IS OUT.

35. SOVIET AND CUBAN ROLE. THE ANTICIPATED EXPANSION OF
SOVIET AND CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE RHODESIAN CRISIS HAS
NOT OCCURRED. MOSCOW CONTINUES TO PROVIDE ARMS AND
ADVISERS TO ZAPU; HAVANA PROVIDES TRAINING TO ZAPU AND TO
MOZAMBIQUE. AND WHILE THE NUMBER OF ADVISERS AND THE
AMOUNTS OF MILITARY MATERIEL HAVE INCREASED, THERE IS NO
EVIDENCE OF A SHARP UPTURN IN EITHER OVER THE PAST FEW
MONTHS. NEITHER MOSCOW NOR HAVANA HAS PROVIDED SUBSTANTIAL
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ZANU IN THE PAST. BUT MUGABE'S
VISITS TO HAVANA AND ADDIS ABABA IN JULY COULD WELL HAVE
RESULTED IN A CUBAN AGREEMENT TO TRAIN ZANU FORCES IN

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ETHIOPIA, AND TO PROVIDE ARMS TO GUERRILLAS IN MOZAMBIQUE.
36. SOUTH AFRICA AND SWAPO CONTINUE TO JOCKEY FOR
POSITION AS THE FRAGILE AGREEMENT CROWNING THE LONG
NEGOTIATING PROCESS ON THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR A

NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT STILL HOLDS. INSTALLATION OF A UN
PRESENCE TO OVERSEE THE PROCESS APPEARS ON THE BRINK OF
REALIZATION. SOUTH AFRICA FINALLY ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL IN
APRIL AND SWAPO, UNDER INTENSE PRESSURE FROM THE FRONT-
LINE STATES, RELUCTANTLY FOLLOWED SUIT IN JULY. BOTH HAVE
SINCE FREELY INTERPRETED THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT TO
THEIR OWN ADVANTAGE.

37. DISPLEASURE WITH THE CONCESSIONS TO SWAPO OVER THE
SOVEREIGNTY OF WALVIS BAY LED SOUTH AFRICA TO THREATEN TO
RENEGE ON ITS ACCEPTANCE. IT HAS WITHHELD FINAL
PERMISSION FOR THE ENTRANCE OF THE UN TEAM (UNTAG) AS A
MEANS OF PRESSURE FOR MORE FAVORABLE TERMS ON THE ISSUES
IT SEES AS PARAMOUNT: THE MAINTENANCE OF THE VOTER
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REGISTRATION PROCESS THAT IT IMPLEMENTED UNILATERALLY IN
DEFIANCE OF THE PROPOSAL, EARLY ELECTIONS FOR A
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, AND THE SIZE OF THE UN FORCE.
THESE MEASURES ARE DESIGNED TO GIVE AN ADVANTAGE TO THE
GROUP IT FAVORS, THE MULTIRACIAL BUT WHITE-DOMINATED AND
ETHNICALLY-ORIENTED DEMOCRAT TURNHALLE ALLIANCE.

38. PRETORIA ALSO PROFESSES TO INSIST ON INDEPENDENCE
BEFORE THE END OF 1978, BUT THIS MANIFESTLY IMPRACTICAL
REQUIREMENT APPEARS INTENDED PRIMARILY AS A BARGAINING
CHIP. AS FURTHER INSURANCE AGAINST EFFECTIVE SWAPO POLI-
TICKING, SOUTH AFRICA'S ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL HAS DETAINED

VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE INTERNAL LEADERSHIP.

39. SWAPO, FOR ITS PART, HAS INSISTED THAT THE VOTER

REGISTRATION BE COMPLETELY REDONE, THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

PERIOD EXTENDED TO PERMIT MOBILIZATION OF SWAPO SUPPORT AND

THE UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE BE GIVEN AUTHORITY GREATER

THAN THAT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN-APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR

GENERAL. SWAPO'S AGREEMENT TO THE SETTLEMENT WAS OBTAINED
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ONLY BY ACCEDING TO ITS DEMANDS FOR SUPPORT FOR ITS CLAIMS
TO WALVIS BAY.

40. SWAPO STILL APP-ARS TO BE BADLY DIVIDED OVER THE WIS-

DOM OF ACCEPTING THE SETTLEMENT. THE PRIMARY ISSUE SEEMS

TO BE THE RETENTION IN NAMIBIA OF SOME SOUTH AFRICAN

TROOPS DURING THE ELECTION. BOTH SWAPO FACTIONS ARE

UNITED IN FEAR THAT:

--THE APPEARANCE OF CONTINUED SOUTH AFRICAN CONTROL,

AND THE THREAT OF REPRISAL THAT THIS RAISES, WILL

INFLUENCE FEARFUL FIRST-TIME VOTERS TO CHOOSE

CANDIDATES FAVORED BY SOUTH AFRICA; AND

--IF THE VOTE SHOULD GO AGAINST PRETORIA, SOUTH

AFRICA WILL UNILATERALLY DENOUNCE THE AGREEMENT

AND THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS AFTER THE EXILES HAVE

RETURNED AND ARE TRAPPED INSIDE.

41. THE COMPROMISERS ARE WILLING TO GAMBLE THAT ARRANGE-

MENTS CAN BE MADE TOMINIMIZE THE INTIMIDATION OF VOTERS AND
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THAT THE THREAT OF STRONG WESTERN COUNTERMEASURES WILL
PREVENT SOUTH AFRICA FROM RENEGING ON AN AGREEMENT. THEY
ARE THEREFORE WILLING TO ACCEPT THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF
SOME SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS IF THEY ARE CONFINED TO CAMPS
AND ARE SIGNIFICANTLY OUTNUMBERED BY UN FORCES.

-

42. THE HARDLINERS DISTRUST NOT ONLY SOUTH AFRICAN
INTENTIONS BUT THOSE OF THE CONTACT GROUP AS WELL.

SOME MAINTAIN THAT NAMIBIA SHOULD BE LIBERATED AND LEADERS
CHOSEN ONLY THROUGH PROTRACTED GUERRILLA WARFARE. OTHERS
ARGUE AGAINST ANY ELECTIONS AS UNNECESSARY AND DIVISIVE,
CITING THE SPECTER OF "ANOTHER ANGOLA" IF DIFFERING
GROUPS ARE ALLOWED TO COMPETE FOR POWER.

43. AMONG SWAPO'S EXTERNAL LEADERS THERE ARE BOTH HARD-
LINERS AND COMPROMISERS. AMONG SWAPO'S INTERNAL FACTION--
THE PARTY ORGANIZATION INSIDE NAMIBIA--THERE APPEARS TO BE
AN EVEN STRONGER CURRENT IN FAVOR OF COMPROMISE.

44. DEVELOPMENTS INSIDE NAMIBIA SUGGEST THAT THERE MAY
WELL BE EROSION OF SWAPO'S POLITICAL SUPPORT TO OTHER
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GROUPS:

--INFLUENTIAL LUTHERAN CHURCH LEADERS, LONG UNOFFICIAL
MENTORS OF SWAPO, HAVE BEEN IMPATIENT AT SWAPO'S

INTRANSIGENCE;

--THE MULTI-RACIAL NNF MAY PICK UP SOME SUPPORT FROM

SWAPO;

--DISSIDENT SWAPO LEADER SHIPANGA, JUST RETURNED TO

NAMIBIA, COULD MAKE SERIOUS INROADS, WITH HIS CLAIMS

OF CORRUPTION, DICTATORIAL METHODS AND SOVIET IN-

FLUENCE ON NUJOMA.

THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE IMPRISONED LEADER, HERMAN TOIVO YA

TOIVO, MAY BE CRITICAL, SINCE IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT

AFTER HIS RELEASE, HE MAY PROVE TO BE THE STRONGEST AND

MOST POPULAR FIGURE IN SWAPO.

45. THERE MAY ALSO BE OTHER POLITICAL REALIGNMENTS. THE

WHITES, DEPENDING ON THEIR PERCEPTION OF THE UN ROLE AND

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SWAPO'S CHANCES, MAY BEGIN A SIGNIFICANT EXODUS. THE DTA,

BEREFT OF ITS ASSASSINATED BLACK LEADER, MAY SUFFER

DEFLECTIONS OR EVEN SPLIT BETWEEN ITS NEW ARCH-CONSERVATIVE

OVAMBO CHAIRMAN AND THE NEW HERERO LEADER WITH REFORMIST

LEANINGS. ALL OF THIS WILL INCREASE THE POTENTIAL FOR

CLASHES AND EVEN, POSSIBLY, SUSTAINED UNREST.

46. MILITARILY, SOUTH AFRICA HAS BEEN PRESSING FOR AN

INFORMAL CEASE-FIRE PENDING FORMAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION,

CASTIGATING SWAPO FAILURE TO AGREE AS EVIDENCE OF BAD

FAITH, AND DECLARING THAT IT WILL NOT BEGIN THE PHASED

WITHDRAWAL ENVISAGED BY THE WESTERN PROPOSAL UNTIL A

"VISIBLE PEACE" IS ESTABLISHED.

47. SWAPO HAS BEEN TALKING TOUGH ABOUT CONTINUING THE MILITARY STRUGGLE, EVEN AFTER THE FORMAL CEASE-FIRE, UNTIL SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES WITHDRAW. RECENTLY RENEWED GUERRILLA INCIDENTS IN OWAMBO AND THE CAPRIVI STRIP WERE FOLLOWED ON AUGUST 23 BY AN APPARENT SWAPO ATTACK FROM ZAMBIA ON A SOUTH AFRICAN BASE IN THE CAPRIVI STRIP. PRETORIA'S

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RETALIATION WAS SWIFT BUT LIMITED, SIGNALLING ITS INTENTION NOT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO DENOUNCE THE AGREEMENT.

48. THE MILITARY EFFECT OF THE RETALIATION IS STILL UNKNOWN AND SWAPO'S REACTION HAS NOT YET SURFACED. IT MAY BE SERIOUSLY DIVIDED ON THIS ISSUE AS WELL, OR THE GUERRILLAS MAY HAVE ACTED WITHOUT SANCTION BY THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. SWAPO WILL PROBABLY BE STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY THE FRONT LINE, WHICH MAY ALSO BE DIVIDED. IF THE SETTLEMENT EFFORT SURVIVES THIS LATEST THREAT, IT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY FACE MANY MORE HURDLES BEFORE IT SUCCEEDS.

49. ZAMBIA. KAUNDA IS FACING THE FIRST POLITICAL CHALLENGE FOR THE PRESIDENCY SINCE ZAMBIA'S INDEPENDENCE IN 1964. BUT, AS HE ALREADY HAS OBTAINED THE ENDORSEMENT OF THE RULING PARTY, UNIP, THE CHALLENGE IS UNLIKELY TO THREATEN HIM. NEVERTHELESS, THIS POLITICAL COMPETITION IS OVER SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, INCLUDING ZAMBIA'S COSTLY AND

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DANGEROUS ROLE IN SUPPORTING THE STRUGGLE AGAINST RHODESIA; GOVERNMENT MISMANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY; AND THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY IN GENERAL. HENCE, KAUNDA WILL BE VULNERABLE TO PRESSURES ON ALL THESE COUNTS. IF HE HOPES TO RETURN TO OFFICE WITH A RESPECTABLE VOTE, HE MAY BE OBLIGED TO TRIM HIS SAILS, AT LEAST ON THE ECONOMY. BUT HE IS UNLIKELY TO ALTER SUBSTANTIALLY HIS CURRENT POLICIES OR METHODS OF GOVERNING.

III. CENTRAL AFRICA

50. ZAIRE. THE KATANGAN INVASION OF SHABA IN MAY--THE SECOND IN TWO YEARS--BROUGHT HOME TO MOBUTU THE PRECARIOUSNESS OF HIS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SITUATION, AND THE URGENT NEED TO SHORE UP HIS REGIME. HE HAS MOVED TO NEUTRALIZE THE KATANGAN THREAT BY SEEKING RAPPROCHEMENT WITH ANGOLA, AND HAS STARTED TO IMPLEMENT SOME OF THE ECONOMIC REFORMS DEMANDED BY HIS WESTERN FINANCIAL BACKERS. HOWEVER, HE STILL SEEMS RELUCTANT TO COME TO GRIPS WITH HIS MOST

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SERIOUS DOMESTIC PROBLEM--DISAFFECTION OF THE SHABAN POPULATION.

51. MOBUTU'S ATTEMPT AT RAPPROCHEMENT WITH ANGOLA--MADE

POSSIBLE BY THE EQUALLY SERIOUS PROBLEMS BESETTING PRESIDENT NETO--HAS MADE SURPRISINGLY RAPID PROGRESS THUS FAR. AT KINSHASA ON AUGUST 19-21, THEY AFFIRMED THEIR INTENTION TO ESTABLISH AN OAU BORDER VERIFICATION COMMISSION, REITERATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF THEIR NATIONALS IN EXILE, AND AGREED TO REOPEN THE BENGUELA RAILWAY AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

52. EVEN SO, THE KEY PROBLEM OF AID TO ONE ANOTHER'S DISSENTS REMAINS UNRESOLVED. NETO APPARENTLY HAS DISARMED AND DISPERSED MANY KATANGAN REBELS. BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT MOBUTU IS PREPARED TO SACRIFICE UNITA AND FNLA IN EXCHANGE FOR NETO'S EFFORTS. THE IMPROVING ZAIRIAN-ANGOLAN RELATIONSHIP COULD STILL FOUNDER ON THIS ISSUE.

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53. THE ZAIRIAN ECONOMY BADLY NEEDS REPAIR. ZAIRE'S WESTERN FINANCIAL DONORS HAVE INDUCED MOBUTU TO PROMISE THOROUGHGOING REFORMS. PREVIOUS PLEDGES OFTEN WENT UNFULFILLED, BUT MOBUTU'S ACCEPTANCE OF WESTERN EXPERTS INTO KEY ECONOMIC POSTS OFFERS SOME HOPE THAT MEASURES TO STABILIZE THE ECONOMY, ROOT OUT CORRUPTION, IMPROVE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, AND ENSURE PROPER REPATRIATION OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE MAY TAKE HOLD.

54. THERE ARE OTHER GROUNDS FOR CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM. THE GECAMINES INSTALLATIONS AT KOLWEZI WERE NOT BADLY DAMAGED. MOREOVER, THE EXODUS OF WESTERN TECHNICIANS HAS SO FAR NOT HAD A DEVASTATING EFFECT ON PRODUCTIVITY, ALTHOUGH

MAINTENANCE REMAINS A PROBLEM. REOPENING THE BENGUELA
RAILWAY COULD BOOST THE ECONOMY, ALTHOUGH THIS MIGHT TAKE
SOME TIME.

55. INTERNALLY, MOBUTU HAS SO FAR MADE LITTLE ATTEMPT AT
POLITICAL RECONCILIATION, APART FROM HIGHLY PUBLICIZED
AMNESTY GESTURES. ANTIPATHY BETWEEN KINSHASA AND SHABA
CONTINUES. ZAIRIAN ARMED FORCES (FAZ) EXACTIONS ON THE
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SHABANS ARE THE MAIN FOCUS OF THEIR DISCONTENT (ALTHOUGH
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL GRIEVANCES CONTINUE). THE DISCRIMINA-
TORY ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE ARMY REINFORCES THE SHABAN
VIEW OF THE FAZ AS AN ARMY OF OCCUPATION.

56. REFORM OF THE FAZ SEEMS ESSENTIAL. MOBUTU HAS
ACCEPTED WESTERN OFFERS OF TRAINING, BUT HAS SO FAR FAILED
TO IMPROVE PAY AND LOGISTICS. HE PURGED THE OFFICER CORPS
LAST SPRING TO ENSURE ITS LOYALTY. THE ARMY STILL SEEMS
TO BE A RELIABLE PROP FOR MOBUTU, BUT MORALE IS POOR.

57. THE SECURITY SITUATION IN SHABA IS STABLE FOR THE
MOMENT, OWING LARGELY TO THE INTER-AFRICAN FORCE PUTTING

AN END TO FAZ EXCESSES. THERE SEEMS NO IMMEDIATE THREAT OF
A THIRD INCURSION. THE FLNC REPORTEDLY IS PREOCCUPIED
WITH INTERNAL SQUABBLING AND RECRIMINATIONS, AND RENEWED
OPERATIONS WOULD REQUIRE ANGOLAN ACQUIESCENCE, CONTRARY TO
NETO'S PRESENT INCLINATIONS.

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58. THE TENURE OF THE INTER-AFRICAN FORCE REMAINS AN OPEN QUESTION. MANY AFRICAN STATES, PARTICULARLY ANGLOPHONES, ARE UNHAPPY ABOUT THE FORCE, BUT MOST CONCEDE ZAIRE'S RIGHT IN PRINCIPLE TO SUMMON OUTSIDE AID.

ANGOLA

59. THE INTERNAL ANGOLAN POLITICAL SITUATION SEEMS TO HAVE STABILIZED. AT PRESENT THERE ARE NO OPEN CHALLENGERS TO PRESIDENT NETO'S LEADERSHIP, DESPITE PERSISTENT REPORTS ABOUT HIS POOR HEALTH. NETO WAS ABSENT FROM LUANDA FOR SEVERAL WEEKS EARLIER THIS SPRING FOR "REST" AND, PRESUMABLY, MEDICAL TREATMENT IN THE USSR. PRIME MINISTER LOPO DO NASCIEMENTO TOOK OVER THE PRESIDENT'S FUNCTIONS DURING THAT PERIOD; HE RELINQUISHED THEM UPON NETO'S RETURN IN MAY.

60. THE MPLA GOVERNMENT STILL FACES, HOWEVER, GRAVE ECONOMIC AND SECURITY PROBLEMS. NETO SEEMS TO BE TRYING TO COPE WITH THESE BY EXPANDING HIS TIES TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND TO THE WEST.

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61. THE ECONOMY, WHILE IMPROVING, IS STILL WEAK. IT SUFFERS FROM SEVERE SHORTAGES OF CONSUMER GOODS, PARTICULARLY IN RURAL AREAS. SEVERE CONGESTION IN THE PORT OF LUANDA AGGRAVATES THE PROBLEM, AS DOES OFFICIAL CORRUPTION,

DOCKSIDE THEFT, AND RETAILER MANIPULATION OF SUPPLIES.

MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS ARE PRESSING--ANGOLA NEEDS TECHNICAL

CADRE AT ALL LEVELS. NETO AND MANY OF HIS COLLEAGUES,

ALTHOUGH NOT ALL OF THE MPLA LEADERSHIP, UNDOUBTEDLY

HOPE THAT FRIENDLY TIES WITH WESTERN NATIONS WILL

PROVIDE ANGOLA WITH ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

NEEDED TO ALLEVIATE MANY OF THESE PROBLEMS.

62. NETO STILL MUST COPE WITH THREE INSURGENCIES. THE

SECURITY PROBLEM IS THE MOST SERIOUS THREAT TO THE MPLA'S

CONTINUANCE IN POWER. LUANDA AND MOST OTHER URBAN

CENTERS ARE FULLY CONTROLLED BY GOVERNMENT FORCES. BUT

INSURGENT ACTION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, PARTICULARLY IN THE

SOUTHEAST, UNITA'S MAJOR AREA OF OPERATION,HAS NOT BEEN
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QUELLED, DESPITE SEVERAL LARGE-SCALE CAMPAIGNS BY

COMBINED GOVERNMENT AND CUBAN FORCES. THE RECENT POLICY

DECISION TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH ZAIRE STEM FROM THE

ANGOLANS' ASSESSMENT THAT UNITA, AND THE FNLA AND FLEC

INSURGENCIES AS WELL, CAN NOT BE EFFECTIVELY PUT DOWN

UNTIL THEIR SUPPLY ROUTES ARE CUT OFF. IN JULY ANGOLA

AND ZAIRE SIGNED AN AGREEMENT WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE

ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO

COUNTRIES, THE REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES, THE REOPENING

OF THE BENGUELA RAILWAY, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A

VERIFICATION COMMISSION TO SUPERVISE THE JOINT BORDER.

63. NETO IS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT HIS SOUTHERN BORDER.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN RAIDS AGAINST SWAPO ENCAMPMENTS IN MAY

ILLUSTRATED ANGOLA'S TERRITORIAL VULNERABILITY. MASSIVE

INFUSIONS OF SOVIET MILITARY AID AND OVER 20,000 CUBAN

TROOPS HAVE NOT BEEN SUFFICIENT TO GUARANTEE THE

COUNTRY'S SECURITY AGAINST CROSS-BORDER MILITARY

OPERATIONS, EITHER BY ANGOLAN DISSIDENTS OR FOREIGN
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FORCES. ANGOLA HAS BEEN HELPFUL IN PERSUADING SWAPO TO

ACCEPT THE CONTACT GROUP PROPOSALS ON NAMIBIA IN PART

BECAUSE IT WISHES AT ALL COSTS TO SEE A NAMIBIAN

SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD REMOVE SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS FROM

ITS SOUTHERN BORDER. NETO, TOGETHER WITH OTHER FRONT-LINE

PRESIDENTS, SEEMS TO HAVE STEADILY ESCALATED THE PRESSURE

ON SWAPO IN ORDER TO FORCE IT TO ACCEPT THE WESTERN

PACKAGE.

64. IN ADDITION, ANGOLA RECENTLY AGREED TO REPATRIATE

EIGHT SOUTH AFRICAN SOLDIERS IN RETURN FOR THREE CUBAN

CADRE UNDER RED CROSS AUSPICES. THE NETO GOVERNMENT SEEMS

TO BE PERSUADED THAT IT CANNOT EFFECTIVELY TACKLE ITS

DOMESTIC PROBLEMS UNTIL THE COUNTRY'S EASTERN AND SOUTHERN

BORDERS ARE SECURE FROM EXTERNAL PENETRATION. IT IS

ACTIVELY SIGNALLING THAT IT CAN PROVE A USEFUL AND

COOPERATIVE PARTNER ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

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IV. OTHER COUNTRIES

NIGERIA

65. INTERNAL. THE PHASED PLAN FOR RESTORATION OF CIVILIAN RULE BY OCTOBER 1979 CONTINUES ON SCHEDULE. THE SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL (SMC) HAS RECEIVED THE CONSTITUTION PREPARED BY THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY BUT HAS NOT YET APPROVED IT. WHILE OPEN POLITICAL ACTIVITY IS NOT TO BEGIN OFFICIALLY UNTIL OCTOBER 1, POLITICAL GROUPINGS ARE ALREADY BEGINNING TO TAKE SHAPE AS NIGERIAN CIVILIAN POLITICIANS--QUIETLY AND WITH DISCRETION UNTIL THE OFFICIAL BAN IS LIFTED--MOVE TO FORM ALLIANCES.

66. THE SMC APPEARS DETERMINED TO CARRY THE PLAN THROUGH, ALTHOUGH MANY NIGERIANS ARE UNEASY THAT OLD REGIONAL, ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES WILL COME TO THE SURFACE WHEN POLITICAL ACTIVITY BEGINS IN EARNEST. THEY FEAR THIS MIGHT LEAD TO DISORDERS WHICH WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO CONTROL.

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67. IN A MOVE TO HELP PREPARE THE WAY FOR CIVILIAN RULE--AND APPARENTLY TO STRENGTHEN ITS HAND WITH REGARD TO MIDDLE GRADE ARMY OFFICERS, SOME OF WHOM ARE REPORTEDLY DISSATISFIED AT THE PROSPECT OF THE TERMINATION OF

MILITARY RULE--THE SMC REPLACED ALL STATE MILITARY GOVERNORS WITH MILITARY ADMINISTRATORS TO BE ASSISTED BY CIVILIAN DEPUTIES, AND REPLACED ALL MILITARY CABINET MEMBERS WHO DID NOT PLAN TO RETIRE FROM THE MILITARY BY OCTOBER 1979.

68. EXTERNAL. NIGERIA'S STRONG ASPIRATIONS TO LEADERSHIP IN AFRICA ARE RESENTED OR FEARED BY SOME AFRICANS STATES BUT IT IS EXPECTED BY VIRTUALLY ALL OF THEM THAT NIGERIA, BECAUSE OF ITS SIZE AND WEALTH, WILL PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS. NIGERIAN LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN MOST EVIDENT IN ITS SUPPORT OF AN INVOLVEMENT IN EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT MAJORITY RULE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND IN ITS EFFORTS, IN BEHALF OF THE OAU, TO MEDIATE

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INTRA-AFRICAN DISPUTES SUCH AS BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA. IT ATTEMPTED MEDIATION BETWEEN ANGOLA AND ZAIRE IN 1977 AND IS APPARENTLY PREPARED TO SERVE ON THE OAU'S PROPOSED BORDER VERIFICATION COMMISSION.

69. NIGERIA, ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES, HAS LONG OPPOSED MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFRICA BY NON-AFRICAN POWERS. HOWEVER, WHEN SUCH INTERVENTION HAS BEEN IN SUPPORT OF A POSITION IT FAVORS IT HAS TENDED TO BE SILENT. IN ANGOLA, THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS WERE SEEN BY LAGOS TO BE INTERVENING ON BEHALF OF A GOVERNMENT THREATENED MILITARILY BY SOUTH AFRICA, AND IN ETHIOPIA ON BEHALF OF

A COUNTRY WHOSE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY WAS BEING
THREATENED BY AN AGGRESSOR. THOUGH IT SAID LITTLE
PUBLICLY, NIGERIA WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THE
INTRODUCTION OF EUROPEAN AND INTRA-AFRICAN FORCES INTO
SHABA EARLIER THIS YEAR. THESE DEVELOPMENTS APPARENTLY
CONTRIBUTED TO THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO MAKE CLEAR
ITS DISAPPROVAL IN PRINCIPLE OF ALL SUCH MILITARY
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INTERVENTION BY NON-AFRICAN POWERS, WHETHER FROM THE EAST
OR WEST, AT THE OAU SUMMIT (SEE V BELOW).

MAURITANIA

70. THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT OF MOKHTAR OULD DADDAH WAS
OVERTHROWN IN A MILITARY COUP IN JULY AND REPLACED BY A
MODERATE MILITARY REGIME. WHILE THE NEW RULING MILITARY
COUNCIL HAS BEEN AT PAINS TO ASSURE MOROCCO THAT IT
STANDS BY THEIR ALLIANCE, IT IS CLEAR THAT ONE OF ITS
PRIMARY OBJECTIVES IS TO BRING AN END TO THE WAR WITH THE
POLISARIO. IT ALSO SEEKS TO SET UP A MORE EFFICIENT
ADMINISTRATION AND TO RESTORE THE BANKRUPT ECONOMY.

V. THE OAU

THE KHARTOUM SUMMIT

71. AFRICAN CHIEFS OF STATE AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES
AGAIN SIDESTEPED SERIOUS INTRA-AFRICAN QUARRELS BUT
ACHIEVED A BROAD MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN
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ISSUES AT THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AT KHARTOUM (JULY 18-22). THE SESSIONS WERE OFTEN DOMINATED BY HEATED DEBATE ON OUTSIDE MILITARY INTERVENTION IN AFRICA, BUT THE SUMMIT WAS CONSISTENT WITH EARLIER MEETINGS IN COMPROMISING ON THIS AND OTHER CONTENTIOUS ISSUES. WHILE THE RESULTANT RESOLUTIONS SEEM BLAND, THEY REFLECT THE FACT THAT THE MODERATES PLANNED AHEAD, MANAGED TO STICK TOGETHER AND WERE PREPARED TO CHALLENGE THE RADICALS. ONCE AGAIN, THE MIDDLE EAST AND PALESTINE ISSUE RECEIVED RELATIVELY LOW-KEY TREATMENT.

72. THE KHARTOUM SUMMIT ATTRACTED 30 HEADS OF STATE AND FOUR HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, A RECORD TURNOUT IN THE HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION AND PROBABLY A CONSEQUENCE OF HEIGHTENED AFRICAN CONCERN OVER THE ISSUE OF OUTSIDE MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE CONTINENT. INCOMING OAU CHAIRMAN NIMEIRI OF SUDAN UNDERSCORED THIS CONCERN IN HIS INAUGURAL ADDRESS, BUT IN THE SUBSEQUENT DEBATE THE HEADS OF STATE

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FOR THE MOST PART HELD TO ALREADY WELL-KNOWN POSITIONS, WITH THE RADICALS DEFENDING THE SOVIET/CUBAN PRESENCE AND THE FRANCOPHONES THEIR FRENCH AND WESTERN CONNECTIONS.

73. NIGERIAN HEAD OF STATE OBASANJO CONDEMNED MILITARY

INTERVENTION IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS BY NON-AFRICAN POWERS IN

A STRONG SPEECH WHICH HIT AT BOTH EAST AND WEST. HE:

--WARNED THE SOVIETS AND "THEIR FRIENDS" NOT TO "OVERSTAY

THEIR WELCOME" IN AFRICA;

--ADMONISHED THE WEST NOT TO REPEAT THE SHABA TYPE OF

INTERVENTION; AND

--WARNED AFRICAN LEADERS NOT TO NEGLECT THEIR PEOPLES AND

THEREBY INDUCE OUTSIDE INTERVENTION.

74. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME A NIGERIAN HEAD OF STATE

HAD PUBLICLY AND EXPLICITLY RAISED THE ISSUE OF SOVIET-

CUBAN MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT FROM AFRICA. THERE IS

EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS FORMALLY PROTESTED OBASANJO'S

REMARKS.

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75. THE TWO RESOLUTIONS ON FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

IN AFRICA WHICH ENSUED FROM THE DEBATE WERE, WHEN

STRIPPED OF THEIR GLOSS OF ANTI-COLONIALIST RHETORIC, THE

ANTICIPATED COMPROMISES WHICH:

--DID NOT CONDEMN OR EVEN MENTION BY NAME ANY NON-AFRICAN

POWER;

--RE-AFFIRMED THE SOVEREIGNTY OF MEMBER STATES (AND, BY

IMPLICATION, THEIR RIGHT TO CALL FOR OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE

WHEN THREATENED);

--ASSERTED THAT AFRICA'S DEFENSE AND SEC'RITY ARE THE SOLE

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AFRICANS THEMSELVES.

76. A COMPANION RESOLUTION ON AN INTER-AFRICAN MILITARY
FORCE OF INTERVENTION CALLS FOR THE RE-ACTIVATION OF THE
DEFUNCT OAU DEFENSE COMMISSION TO CONSIDER THE
DESIRABILITY OF ESTABLISHING SUCH A FORCE UNDER THE AEGIS
OF THE OAU. IN A POST-SUMMIT PRESS CONFERENCE, CHAIRMAN
NIMEIRI SAID THAT THE AGREEMENT ON THIS FORCE WAS BASED
ON THE CONDITIONS THAT THE OAU CONTROL ITS COMMAND,
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ADMINISTRATION, ARMS SUPPLY AND TRAINING. IT IS LIKELY
THAT THIS, LIKE PAST AFRICAN EFFORTS AT MILITARY
COOPERATION, WILL PROCEED SLOWLY, IF AT ALL.

77. ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES, THE OAU DEMONSTRATED ITS
USUAL UNANIMITY OF SENTIMENT. INTRA-AFRICAN CONFLICTS,
ON THE OTHER HAND, PROVED AS INTRACTABLE AS EVER,
RESULTING EITHER IN COMPROMISE RESOLUTIONS OR NO ACTION
AT ALL. ON THE SPECIFIC ISSUES OF PEACEKEEPING, THE
SUMMIT MADE NO FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARD MEDIATING DISPUTES
BETWEEN SOMALIA AND ETHIOPIA CHAD AND LIBYA OR SUDAN AND
ETHIOPIA. IT HAD NO GREATER SUCCESS IN FINDING WAYS TO
STRENGTHEN OAU PEACEKEEPING MACHINERY, BEYOND URGING
VARIOUS EXISTING AD HOC GOOD OFFICES COMMISSIONS TO CARRY
ON. CONSIDERATION OF THE DISPUTE OVER THE WESTERN SAHARA
WAS AGAIN DEFERRED.

VI. AFRICAN POLICY OF THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES

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78. WHILE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA RANKS WELL BELOW THE MIDDLE EAST IN MOSCOW'S PRIORITIES, SOVIET INVOLVEMENT THERE HAS INCREASED SHARPLY SINCE THE 1975 ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR. IT REMAINS THE MOST ATTRACTIVE REGION FOR EXPANDING SOVIET THIRD WORLD INTERESTS AND INFLUENCE. DESPITE THE RECENT UPSURGE IN ACTIVITY, SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN AFRICA HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY COHERENT AND CONSISTENT OVER THE YEARS.

THE USSR HAS TRIED TO:

--CONTAIN AND DIMINISH WESTERN AND CHINESE INFLUENCE

WHILE EXPANDING ITS OWN WHENEVER POSSIBLE;

--GAIN AFRICAN SUPPORT FOR, OR ACQUIESCENCE IN, SOVIET

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL FOREIGN POLICY GOALS;

--DEVELOP BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH AFRICAN STATES THAT

CAN FURNISH THE SOVIETS WITH ACCESS TO DESIRED MILITARY

FACILITIES AND SOMETIMES TRADE AND RESOURCES; AND

--ENCOURAGE AFRICANS TO ADOPT DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS AND

POLITICAL SYSTEMS BASED ON "NON-CAPITALIST" PRINCIPLES.

79. SOVIET APPROACHES TO AFRICA ARE ESSENTIALLY PRAGMATIC

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AND MOSCOW REMAINS READY TO SEIZE OPPORTUNITIES TO ADVANCE ITS OBJECTIVES AS THEY ARISE AND TO COMMIT RESOURCES TO A GROWING ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS.

80. ARMS TRANSFERS AND MILITARY TRAINING ASSISTANCE HAVE

BECOME INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY IN
THE USSR'S DEALINGS WITH AFRICA. IN TERMS OF REGIONAL
DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET ARMS SALES AND OF MILITARY TRAIN-
ING ASSISTANCE, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA CURRENTLY RANKS SECOND
ONLY TO THE MIDDLE EAST. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IS LESS
IMPORTANT.

81. FROM THE BEGINNING, AND CONSISTENT WITH ITS GOALS,
THE USSR HAS SOUGHT A CONTINENT-WIDE ROLE IN AFRICA.
SINCE THE MID-1960'S, HOWEVER, SOVIET RESOURCES HAVE BEEN
ALLOCATED WITH CLEAR PRIORITY GIVEN THOSE AREAS WHERE
GENUINE OPPORTUNITIES TO ADVANCE SOVIET INTERESTS WERE
PERCEIVED. IN RECENT YEARS THE BULK OF THESE RESOURCES
HAS BEEN USED IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE HORN. SOVIET
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PRIORITIES ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN FOCUSED THERE. ELSEWHERE
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, MOSCOW CONTINUES TO TAKE ADVANTAGE
OF OPPORTUNITIES AFFORDED BY WEAK AND SOMETIMES ISOLATED
REGIMES TO EXPAND SOVIET INFLUENCE OR TO PROMOTE ITS
POLITICO-MILITARY GOALS.

82. THE SOVIET-WEST AFRICAN NAVAL PATROL--CONSIDERABLY
EXPANDED SINCE THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR IN 1975--HAS AN
ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL ROLE. IT MAINTAINS A CONTINUOUS
VISIBLE PRESENCE IN WEST AFRICAN WATERS--AS OPPOSED TO
OCCASIONAL VISITS--AND CONSEQUENTLY ITS POLITICAL IMPACT
IS INTENSIFIED. ITS SHIPS ARE IN A POSITION TO OFFER

SUPPORT TO OR INSPIRE A SENSE OF SECURITY IN "PROGRESSIVE"
REGIMES FRIENDLY TO THE USSR AS WELL AS PROVIDE A
CONSTANT REMINDER TO MODERATE REGIMES THAT THE USSR IS
A GLOBAL POWER. ALSO, SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY IN AND
AROUND THE INDIAN OCEAN HAS CHANGED DRAMATICALLY DURING
THE PAST YEAR IN RESPONSE TO EVENTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA.

83. CUBA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR IN AFRICA HAS
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ENABLED CASTRO TO PLAY A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ROLE AS A
SUPPORTER OF REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS AND "PROGRESSIVE"
GOVERNMENTS. SOVIET AND CUBAN OBJECTIVES IN AFRICA ARE
CLOSELY COMPLEMENTARY AND THE USSR HAS CONTINUED READILY
TO ASSUME THE MAJOR COSTS OF CUBAN COMMITMENTS. TO A
CONSIDERABLE DEGREE, HOWEVER, CASTRO HAS BECOME A HOSTAGE
TO HIS OWN ACTIVISM IN AFRICA. CUBA'S MILITARY INTER-
VENTION IN ANGOLA--WHICH HAS BECOME MORE INVOLVED AND OF
MUCH LONGER DURATION THAN CASTRO PROBABLY ANTICIPATED--
HAS CREATED EXPECTATIONS IN AFRICA THAT CUBA WOULD RESPOND
TO ALL REQUESTS FOR MILITARY AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.
AS IN ANGOLA, CUBAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN ETHIOPIA HAS
EXPANDED WELL BEYOND WHAT HAVANA HAD PROBABLY ORIGINALLY
EXPECTED.

84. DEEPENING CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA HAS BROUGHT ON
CERTAIN COMPLICATIONS. CUBA HAS FOUND ITSELF ON THE
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OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE FENCE FROM MOST ARAB COUNTRIES OVER
ETHIOPIA. AND CASTRO'S INTEREST IN PROMOTING A SETTLEMENT
IN THE HORN PROBABLY STEMS IN LARGE PART FROM HIS DESIRE
TO AVOID A SPLIT WITH ARAB SUPPORTERS OF ERITREAN
INDEPENDENCE GROUPS AND SOMALIA. ALSO CUBA'S CLOSE
ASSOCIATION WITH THE SOVIETS IN AFRICA CAUSED SOME AFRICAN
MEMBERS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT TO PUBLICLY QUESTION
WHETHER CUBA COULD RIGHTFULLY BE CONSIDERED NON-ALIGNED.
HOWEVER, CUBA WAS ABLE TO WIN CONFIRMATION OF ITS NON-
ALIGNED CREDENTIALS AT THE MEETING OF THE NON-ALIGNED
COORDINATING COMMITTEE IN JULY.

85. OF THE EAST EUROPEAN WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, EAST
GERMANY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND POLAND PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR
SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN AFRICA. CZECHOSLOVAKIA, WHICH ONCE
PLAYED A SPEARHEAD ROLE IN SOVIET PENETRATION OF THE
THIRD WORLD, CURRENTLY RANKS A DISTANT SECOND TO EAST
GERMANY WHICH IS NOW AFRICA'S LARGEST EAST EUROPEAN WARSAW
PACT MILITARY SUPPLIER AND ECONOMIC DONOR. POLAND RANKS

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THIRD, BUT BECAUSE OF ITS OWN ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES
WARSAW HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO DO VERY MUCH.

86. EAST GERMANY'S ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA HAVE EXPANDED
SUBSTANTIALLY DURING THE LAST THREE YEARS AND AFRICA HAS

BECOME ITS MAIN FOCUS IN THE THIRD WORLD. THE GDR NOW
RANKS THIRD--AFTER THE USSR AND CUBA--AS A SUPPLIER OF
POLITICAL, IDEOLOGICAL, SECURITY AND ECONOMIC BACKING
FOR SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN AFRICA. BY THE MID-1970'S THE
GDR SUPPLEMENTED SOVIET AND CUBAN EFFORTS IN AFRICA
THROUGH SPECIALIZING IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY CADRES,
POLICE, GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS, AND IDEOLOGICALLY ORTHODOX PARTY ORGANIZATIONS.
AS SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA HAVE
EXPANDED, THE GDR HAS ADDED MILITARY AID AND TRAINING TO
ITS ROLE. EAST GERMANY IS RELATIVELY HEAVILY INVOLVED
IN THREE COUNTRIES--ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE AND ETHIOPIA--TO
A SOMEWHAT LESSER EXTENT IN THE CONGO, AND ON A LOW LEVEL
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BUT INCREASINGLY IN GUINEA, GUINEA-BISSAU AND SUDAN.
THE GDR ALSO ASSISTS SWAPO AND ZAPU. CHRISTOPHER

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